Cultural Voting
The Eurovision Song Contest

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Abstract

We analyze the voting behavior and ratings of judges in a popular song contest held every year in Europe. The dataset makes it possible to analyze the determinants of success, and gives a rare opportunity to run a direct test of vote trading, or logrolling. Though the votes cast may appear as resulting from logrolling, we show that they are rather driven by linguistic and cultural proximities between singers and voting countries.

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1 Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the determinants of success and voting behavior of judges in one of the most popular singing contest held since 1956 in Europe, the Eurovision Song Contest. The competition is interesting since each country (player) votes for (a singer or a group of singers of) other participating countries. This gives a rare opportunity to test in a direct way whether players exchange votes.

Such exchanges seem indeed to happen. In the last contest (May 2004) for example, Ukraine, the winning country, benefited from the votes from all its former political "neighbors." Its average marks were 8.1, but it received 12 (the highest marks) from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia, and 10 (the next highest, since 11 does not exist) from Belarus and Serbia. Another example involves two other countries which, though they were very far from winning, could be suspected to have colluded in their voting: Holland, with an average rating of 2.3 received 5 points from Belgium, which in turn received 6 from Holland, though its average rating was only 3.7. It is therefore reasonable to suspect that voting agreements are struck, or that countries cast political votes.[1]

An identical concern has been raised for international sports or artistic competitions, where country judges vote for their neighbors, or, worse, for those countries which, in turn vote for them, as was the case in a recent ice skating competition (2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City), involving a judge who admitted she had been pressured to vote for a Russian skater.

Exchanges of votes have been analyzed in other contexts, such as national or international parliaments, and the welfare effects of logrolling are frequently discussed in the theoretical literature.[2] Empirical evidence for such behavior is, however, paid only scant attention, mainly because the practice is illegal, and thus hidden, and data are difficult to analyze. Exceptions are Stratmann (1992) and Elvik (1995). Stratmann analyzes logrolling in the U. S. Congress. His results support the hypothesis of vote trading. Elvik finds that the distribution of highway expenditures in Norway, can also

[1] See for instance the discussion on http://homepage.ntlworl.com/waterloo/ 2000/politics.htm, which seems to criticize Terry Wogan, the BBC-TV commentator for having suggested that, though there should be no political issue at stake, the vote was political rather than artistic.

[2] See e. g. Mueller (2003, pp. 104-109).

be explained by logrolling. One serious problem with the results is that they fail to control for ideology, which may drive the results.

In international environments, such as the European Parliament or the United Nations, it is difficult to disentangle what is sincere voting (that is, based on preferences) and what is strategic voting on political issues, which often arise in regional contexts: North European countries, for instance, are very sensitive to ecological problems and are likely to follow each other's voting, without being strategic.

We show that what may look as strategic voting in the Eurovision Contest is in fact sincere voting based on liguistic and cultural proximity. Still, one can argue that the voting is inefficient since it takes into account factors that are not purely artistic, but at least there seems to be no exchange of votes. We cannot, however, exclude cultural voting.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the main features of the competition are given. Section 3 discusses the voting equation. Section 4 turns to the definition of linguistic and cultural distances that will be used in our equations. Section 5 describes our estimation results, and Section 6 concludes.

2 The Eurovision Song Contest

The Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) was born in 1955, and held for the first time in Lugano, Switzerland, in 1956, with seven countries competing. The number of participants increased to 16 in 1961. Non-European countries can also take part: Israel, Morocco, and Turkey are now regular participants. The only restriction is that the television that broadcasts the show (that is the previous year's winning country since 1958) has to be member of the European Broadcasting Union. Since 2002, there are 24 slots for finalists,[3] of which four are reserved for the Big Four (Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom). Other countries are guaranteed a slot every other year. Each ESC is broadcast by television, and since 1985, this happens via satellite. In 2001, the contest was held in front of an audience of 38,000 in Copenhagen, and broadcast live all around the world. Nowadays, it is watched by several hundred millions of people.

[3] There are several stages in which low quality participants are eliminated.

The scoring system changed several times. Since 1975 – the first year in our dataset –, the 11 (16 between 1988 and 1997) jury members in each country (often a popular jury, not consisting of experts), can rate on a scale from 1 to 10. Televoting was introduced in 1998, so that every citizen can participate, and according to Haan, Dijkstra and Dijkstra (2003), "in many countries, the number of people calling in to register their vote is in the hundreds of thousands."

The ratings are normalized so that the favorite song gets 12 points, the next one 10, and then 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1. This allows each voting country to give positive ratings to ten other countries. Participating countries cannot vote for their nationals.

The order in which candidates perform is randomly drawn before the competition starts. After the performance ends, countries are asked to cast their votes. Results are announced country by country, in the same order in which participants perform. Participants are ranked according to their aggregate score.

3 The Voting Equation

The purpose is to explain v_{ij}, the vote (that is, the number of points) cast by the judges of country $i \in L$ in evaluating the performer of country $j \in L$ ($i \neq j$, since country i cannot vote for its own candidate), where L is the total number of participating countries.

If countries i and j ($i \neq j$) exchanged their votes, without taking into account any other dimension, the voting equation could simply be written

$$v_{ij} = \alpha v_{ji} + u_{ij}, \tag{1}$$

where α is a parameter, and u_{ij} a random disturbance. If exchanges of votes were "perfect," and both countries kept their committment, α would be equal to 1.

More generally, such an equation should contain variables $x_{jk}, k = 1, ..., K$ measuring the K characteristics of performer j, as well as characteristics $z_{il}, l = 1, ..., L$ of the voter, and read

$$v_{ij} = \alpha v_{ji} + \sum_k \beta_k x_{jk} + \sum_l \gamma_l z_{il} + u_{ij}, \tag{2}$$

where the β and the γ are parameters to be estimated.

Ignoring for the time being the problems posed by simultaneity, (v_{ij} and v_{ji} appear both in the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the equation), logrolling can be checked by testing whether α is different from zero. If so, logrolling can be suspected.

Two problems have to be solved. The first is concerned with the fact that v_{ij} will appear on the other side of the equation for the observation concerning the vote of country j for the singer representing country i. This can be dealt with in several ways. First, and this is the easy way, instead of using v_{ji} in the right-hand side, one can use the vote cast in the previous competition, say $v_{ji,-1}$, though one could think that countries would not necessarily keep their committment over time. An alternative is to use only half of the observations so that every v_{ij} that appears in the left-hand side of the equation is not used in the right-hand side. This is further discussed in Section 5.

The second problem is concerned with what should be the most important determinant in voting: the quality or intrinsic talent of the performer. Since talent is not observed, the variable must be constructed. One way of doing this is to take the ex-post average rating of a musician j by the juges of countries $l \in L$, $l \neq j$. This has two drawbacks. First, it contains elements of circularity, since it may be considered as explaining the result of the competition, by the result itself. Second, including in this measure of quality the judgment of judge i when considering i's vote, creates some additional endogeneity. Therefore, quality q is defined for each vote v_{ij} cast by i for j by excluding i's vote:

$$q_j^i = \sum_{l \neq i,j} v_{lj}. \tag{3}$$

A better alternative is to instrument quality. As will be shown in Section 5, a valid instrument is provided by lagged quality, defined by $q_{j,-1}^i = \sum_{l \neq i,j} v_{lj,-1}$.

The voting equation is estimated by linear methods but since votes (in fact ratings) are integers that take values between 0 and 12 (with the exclusion of 9 and 11), ordered probit and Tobit methods[4] will also be used.

[4]Only 11 performers get positive rates. Since there are on average 22 competitors, 11 are rated 0.

4 Data

4.1 Contests

Extensive information on the Eurovision Song Contest is available on various websites.[5] Votes and variables such as "Order of performance" and "Host country" can be collected from there.

Data on contests cover 29 years (1975-2003), with an average of 22 participating countries. This produces 462 votes (22 times 21) for each competition. Given that values of several variables are missing – in particular cultural and linguistic distances, see below – and since we use lagged votes we end up with 4,074 observations. Using lagged quality as an instrument for present quality, further reduces the number of observations to 3,721 in some regressions.

The influence of the order in which musicians appear in a competition has often been outlined. Ginsburgh and Flores (1996), Ginsburgh and Van Ours (2003), and Glejser and Heyndels (2001) observe that in one of the top-ranked international piano competitions, the Queen Elisabeth competition, those who perform first are less likely to receive high ratings. Similar observations are made by Haan, Dijkstra and Dijkstra (2003) for the contest that we are dealing with. The exogenous order in which candidates perform is thus included as determinant. Other variables include (a) a dummy for host country, determined by the citizenship of the previous year's winner–the variable takes the value 1 for the performer whose citizenship is the same as that of the host country–, (b) the language in which the artist sings (English, French, other),[6] (c) gender of the artist,[7] and (d) whether the artist sings alone, in a duet or in a group.

Voters' characteristics are more difficult to describe, and we will simplify

[5]See for example http://www.eurosong.net/data/database.htm or http://members.fortunecity.com/mcdeil69.

[6]Information on the language in which a song was presented (English, French, Other) is based on the title of the song. Note that in some cases, a title in English or French does not necessarily mean that the song was entirely performed in English or in French. Likewise, a song performed essentially in English or French may have a title in another language.

[7]Gender of the singer or composition of the group (Male, Female, Duet) were constructed from the records' covers which include pictures. In some cases, however, neither name, nor photograph were sufficient to guess gender. Sometimes the cover of the record was not available at all.

this part of the model by assuming that each voting country is represented by a dummy.

The last group of variables will include linguistic and cultural distances between performers and voters. Note that these variables describe differences between voters and performers, and may dispense us from using variables that characterize voters.

4.2 Linguistic and Cultural Distances

Linguistic distances are based on the lexicostatistical method, invented by Morris Swadesh (1952). The method starts with a list of meanings that are basic enough for every culture to have words for them, for example, *mother, father, blood,* digits, etc. The list used by Dyen et al. (1992) contains 200 such meanings. Phonetic representations are collected for the words with these meanings for a group of languages.[8] For each meaning, a linguist makes expert judgments of cognation. Two forms are said to be *cognate* if they both descend in unbroken lines from a common ancestral word. For each pair of languages, a lexicostatistical percentage between languages l and m is computed. It is equal to $n^0_{lm}/(n^0_{lm} + n_{lm})$, where n^0_{lm} is the number of meanings for which the speech varieties l and m are classified as "not cognate" and n_{lm} is the number of meanings for which they are "cognate:"[9] the larger this number, the more "distant" the two languages. Note that this measure avoids words which are common because they have been borrowed,[10] and may overestimate the distance between languages, since in many cases, such as French and English, a large number of French words have been borrowed by English in the past, while, in more recent times, the borrowing also works the other way round. This makes some languages less distant than what is suggested by the lexicostatistical method.[11]

[8]Swadesh and his followers used the idea for Indo-European languages, but this has since been extended to African and American Indian languages.

[9]The number of "doubtfully cognate" meanings does not enter into the calculation.

[10]For example, "flower" was borrowed from the French word "fleur," but "blossom" and "fleur" are cognate. See Dyen et al. (1992, p. 95).

[11]It is worth mentioning that this approach was used to regroup languages into family trees and to calculate the dates at which separations between languages have occurred. See Ruhlen (1994). This technique, known as "glottochronology," has, however, recently been seriously challenged.

National culture differences are represented by the four dimensions[12] studied by Geert Hofstede (1980, 1991). Hofstede claims that his ideas started with a research project across subsidiaries of the multinational corporation IBM in 64 countries. Subsequent studies by others covered students in 23 countries, elites in 19 countries, commercial airline pilots in 23 countries, up-market consumers in 15 countries, and civil service managers in 14 countries. These studies identified and scored the four following dimensions that make for "cultural differences:"[13]

(a) *power distance* measures the extent to which the less powerful members of a society accept that power is distributed unequally; it focuses on the degree of equality between individuals;
(b) *individualism* measures the degree to which individuals in a society are integrated into groups; it focuses on the degree a society reinforces individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships;
(c) *masculinity* refers to the distribution of roles between genders in a society; it focuses on the degree to which a society reinforces the traditional masculine work role of male achievement, control, and power;
(d) *uncertainty avoidance* deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty or ambiguity, and refers to man's search for truth.

Table 2 illustrates the correlations between the various variables for the countries and native languages that are present in our sample. Uncertainty Avoidance is correlated with three other variables, but otherwise, distances seem to pick very different dimensions of peoples' behavior.

5 Estimation Results

Columns (a) to (d) of Table 3 contain the results of an OLS estimation of equation

[12]Hofstede adds a fifth distance (long-term orientation) that originates from a research conducted in 23 countries only. Since many countries that are represented in our sample are missing, this dimension cannot be used here. For details, see Hofstede and Bond (1988) and Chinese Cultural Connection (1987).

[13]The definitions are taken from http://spitswww.uvt.nl/web/iric/hofstede/page3.htm and http://geert-hofstede.international-business-center.com/index.shtml (April 2004), a webpage on which the data can also be found.

$$v_{ij} = \alpha v_{ji,-1} + \beta_1 q_j^i + \sum_k \beta_k x_{jk} + \sum_l \gamma_l z_{il} + u_{ij},$$

using (3) as the definition of quality q_j^i. Column (e) contains the results of a TSLS estimation, in which quality is instrumented by $q_{j,-1}^i$ and $q_{j,-2}^i$, the lagged qualities obtained in the two previous competitions.

We first observe that quality always plays a very significant role, which should of course not be surprising.[14] Logrolling is significant only in Eq. (a), in which no account is taken of linguistic and cultural distances. It ceases to be so in all the other equations once linguistic and/or cultural distances are also accounted for. Note that even when the coefficient is significantly different from zero, its value is very small. Order of appearance plays no role, while among the other variables, the only one which has some influence is "sung in French." Though not all distance coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent probability level, they all pick negative signs (the larger the distance, the lower the rating). The parameters picked by the voting country dummies are not reported in Table 1, since none of them is significantly different from 0 at the usual five percent probablity level, and a standard F-test shows that they can be ignored.

The instruments used for quality satisfy both validity conditions for "good" instruments. Current quality q_j^i was regressed on all exogenous variables as well as on $q_{j,-1}^i$ and $q_{j,-2}^i$, which picked t-statistics of 3 and 7 respectively, showing that we do not face weak instruments. It is not surprising that this correlation is high, since having been among the winners exerts pressure on future contestants. The exogeneity condition is also satisfied. The economic argument is that the current year's vote can obviously have no effect on the lagged vote and therefore, on quality. Secondly, the overidentifying restrictions test, which can be used since we have more instruments than endogenous variables, leads to a χ^2 value of 0.74, while the tabulated value with one degree of freedom is equal to 3.84 at the 5 percent level.

As can be seen from Appendix Tables 1 and 2, estimation results using an ordered probit specification and a Tobit specification, lead to very similar results. Note that in order to save on the number of parameters since convergence is an issue here, we excluded voting country dummies.[15]

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[14] Actually, this can be interpreted as signalling that there is large agreement between judges on the rating of candidates.

[15] Equations (a) to (e) of Table 3 have also been estimated without voting country

Our results make it clear that some of the variables have statistically significant effect on votes. However, since these are measured in different units, it is not easy to see which ones have meaningful effects. Table 4 compares the regression coefficients in Equation (d) of Table 3 with standardized regression coefficients, obtained after multiplication of the regression coefficients by s_j/s_y where s_j and s_y represent the standard deviations of regressor j and of the dependent variable y.[16] Quality of the singer remains the most important variable, but the effect of vote trading is dwarfed by the effect of lingustic and cultural distances.

Table 5 reproduces results in which quality, as well as other variables are replaced by fixed performer and voter effects. Vote trading is tested by the introduction of lagged votes in equations (a)-(c), and current votes in equations (d)-(f). Conclusions are identical to the previous ones: the logrolling effect vanishes once linguistic and cultural distances are accounted for.

Introducing current votes is however problematic, since every v_{ij} appears in both sides of the equation. Estimating the voting equation with half of the votes would solve the issue, though one has to decide which half should be chosen. To get some insight, we run 100 regressions[17] on 100 random samples of half the number of observations, and count the number of times each parameter is or ceases to be significantly different from zero at the five and the one percent probability levels. Results of these simulations appear in Table 6. They show that quality remains significant in all cases, but as can be checked, the logrolling effect ceases to be significantly different from zero once linguistic and cultural distances are introduced.

6 Conclusions

In the popular competition examined in our paper, there is no evidence for logrolling. By contrast, cultural and linguistic proximities obviously play a significant role. The data that are at hand here make it possible to isolate the effect, since judges cast votes on individuals, and the rating system is

dummies. The results are identical to those reported in Table 1.

[16]See Goldberger (1964, pp. 197-198.)

[17]Only OLS were used here, since they lead to results that are similar to those obtained by other estimation methods. The number of 100 samples was chosen arbitrarily.

finer than the usual "yes, no, abstain" voting system. It may well be that cultural proximities are also at work in international political bodies, such as the European Parliament and the United Nations, and that what appears as being logrolling is due to cultural factors.

Note that the effect of vote trading, even if there is some, is small: The largest coefficient obtained in our equations is equal to 0.04, while the "average" value of the vote cast by a country is equal to 3.[18] Though the effect is significantly different from zero, it disappears once account is taken of culture and language. But even so, ratings by judges are inefficient, since they should be based on quality only, and not on cultural proximities.

One can wonder whether popular voting, in which every citizen in a country can vote through the internet, or by telephone, will not be even more distortive, though experts are by no means very good judges.[19] Popular voting may also have unexpected consequences in today's global world. An example may illustrate the issue. In 1996, Turkey won the competition, with very high grades given by those countries in which the number of Turkish immigrants was highest, as shown by the following numbers: Germany (vote: 10; Turkish population: 2 millions), France (10; 261,000), The Netherlands (12: 260,000), Austria (12; 142,000), Belgium (12; 119,000). Migrants who often long for their home country are obviously likely to support their nationals, and probably more likely than the country's nationals to take part in popular polls such as the Eurovision contest, therefore biasing the result in the favor of their home country.

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[18](1+2+...10+12)/22, where the grades appear between brackets, and 22 is the average number of participants in a competition.

[19]See for example Ginsburgh (2003) and Ginsburgh and Van Ours (2003).

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Table 1. The Dyen Matrix of Linguistic Distances Between Selected Languages

	English	French	German	Italian	Spanish
Danish	0.407	0.759	0.293	0.737	0.750
Dutch	0.392	0.756	0.162	0.740	0.742
English	0	0.764	0.422	0.753	0.760
Finnish	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
French	0.764	0	0.756	0.197	0.291
German	0.422	0.756	0	0.735	0.747
Greek	0.838	0.843	0.812	0.822	0.833
Italian	0.753	0.197	0.735	0	0.212
Portuguese	0.760	0.291	0.753	0.227	0.126
Spanish	0.760	0.291	0.747	0.212	0
Swedish	0.411	0.756	0.305	0.741	0.747

Notes. Since Finnish is not a Indo-European language, it is not included in Dyen et al (1992). Given its linguistic remoteness, its distance to every language in the table was set to 1. Source: Dyen, Kruskal and Black (1992, pp. 102-117).

Table 2. Correlations Between Linguistic and Cultural Distances

	Lang.	Power	Individ.	Masc.	Uncert. Avoid.
Language	1				
Power	0.205	1			
Individualism	0.254	0.111	1		
Masculinity	-0.092	0.031	-0.128	1	
Uncertainty Avoidance	0.319	0.567	0.404	0.083	1

Table 3. The Voting Equation. Linear Model

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Quality	0.911**	0.914**	0.901**	0.905**	0.820**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.173)
Lagged vote	0.028*	0.022	0.018	0.016	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Order of perf.	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.003	0.008
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	0.011
Host country	0.177	0.191	0.155	0.171	0.369
	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.340)
Sung in English	0.140	0.193	0.101	0.135	0.272
	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.272)
Sung in French	0.353*	0.354*	0.343	0.347*	0.394
	(0.167)	(0.169)	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.272)
Male singer	0.139	0.148	0.147	0.154	0.114
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.141)
Duet	0.223	0.147	0.203	0.174	0.237
	(0.198)	(0.196)	(0.200)	0.199	0.215
Group	0.100	0.080	0.087	0.079	0.013
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.142)
Language	-	-1.142**	-	-0.634**	-0.528
		(0.222)		(0.240)	(0.270)
Power	-	-	-0.015**	-0.012*	-0.013
			(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Individualism	-	-	-0.005	-0.003	-0.005
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Masculinity	-	-	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006*
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Uncertainty Avoidance	-	-	-0.009**	-0.008*	-0.008*
			(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Intercept	0.031	0.710**	0.918**	1.148**	1.290*
	(0.213)	(0.248)	(0.267)	(0.281)	(0.509)
R-square	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30
No. of obs.	4,074	4,074	4,074	4,074	3,721

Robust standard errors appear between brackets. ** and * for significantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 percent probability level. Coefficients for vote giver countries are included but not reported.

Table 4. The Voting Equation. Standardized Coefficients

	Regression coefficient	Standardized coefficient
Quality	0.905**	0.528
Lagged vote	0.016	0.016
Order of perf.	0.003	0.005
Host country	0.171	0.011
Sung in English	0.135	0.015
Sung in French	0.347*	0.029
Male singer	0.154	0.017
Duet	0.174	0.013
Group	0.079	0.009
Language	-0.634**	-0.045
Power	-0.012*	-0.047
Individualism	-0.003	-0.010
Masculinity	-0.005	-0.026
Uncertainty Avoidance	-0.008*	-0.046

** and * for significantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 percent probability level.

Table 5. The Voting Equation. Linear Model with Fixed Effects

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Lagged vote	0.038**	0.012	0.016	-	-	-
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)			
Current vote	-	-	-	0.076**	0.021	0.028
				(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Language	-1.711**	-	-0.666**	-1.561**	-	-0.250
	(0.180)		(0.223)	(0.218)		(0.289)
Power	-	-0.004	-0.004	-	-0.001	0.001
		(0.003)	(0.005)		(0.004)	(0.006)
Individualism	-	0.000	0.001	-	0.001	-0.002
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.006)
Masculinity	-	-0.004	-0.004	-	-0.005	-0.005
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.004)
Uncertainty Avoidance	-	-0.014**	-0.013**		-0.013**	-0.017**
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.004)
R-square	0.33	0.35	0.34	0.31	0.34	0.34
No. of obs.	5,778	5,682	4,102	4,002	3,597	2,529

Estimates for intercept and country and year specific dummies are not reported. Robust standard errors appear between brackets. ** and * for sigificantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 percent probability level.

Table 6. The Voting Equation. Linear Model
with Simultaneous Effect of Logrolling
(Average value of coefficients and number of cases
with coefficient significantly different from 0)

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Quality	0.862	0.878	0.916	0.916
Signif. at 5% level	100	100	100	100
Signif. at 1% level	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*
Simultaneous vote	0.082	0.077	0.026	0.026
Signif. at 5% level	100	100	32	10
Signif. at 1% level	*100*	*100*	*1*	*0*
Language		-1.577		-0.675
Signif. at 5% level		100		76
Signif. at 1% level		*46*		*17*
Power			-0.006	-0.009
Signif. at 5% level			32	36
Signif. at 1% level			*15*	*17*
Individualism			-0.001	-0.000
Signif. at 5% level			6	10
Signif. at 1% level			*2*	*2*
Masculinity			-0.005	-0.008
Signif. at 5% level			42	71
Signif. at 1% level			*14*	*34*
Uncertainty avoidance			-0.012	-0.010
Signif. at 5% level			96	74
Signif. at 1% level			*84*	*43*
No. of obs.	6,452	3,949	3,564	2,509

Equation (a) contains neither language nor other cultural distances. Equations (b), (c) and (d) respectively contain language distances, cultural distances and both types of distances. Equations also include other variables (order of performance, host country, sung in English, sung in French, male singer, duet, group, and intercept, but results are not reported.

Appendix Table 1. The Voting Equation. Ordered Probit Model

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Quality	0.303**	0.305**	0.304**	0.305**	0.292**
	(0.009)	(0.0009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.032)
Lagged vote	0.009*	0.008	0.004	0.004	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Order of perf.	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	0.003
Host country	0.036	0.040	0.030	0.035	0.086
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.083)
Sung in English	0.045	0.061	0.034	0.044	0.045
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.052)
Sung in French	0.085	0.086	0.079	0.080	0.102
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.065)
Male singer	0.036	0.041	0.038	0.041	0.003
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Duet	0.124*	0.100	0.123	0.113	0.061
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.068)
Group	0.044	0.038	0.037	0.035	0.003
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Language	-	-0.318*	-	-0.182*	-0.157
		(0.065)		(0.071)	(0.081)
Power	-	-	-0.004*	-0.003	-0.004*
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Individualism	-	-	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Masculinity	-	-	-0.002	-0.002*	-0.002*
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Uncertainty Avoidance	-	-	-0.004*	-0.003*	-0.002
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Intercept	-0.913*	-0.733*	-0.622*	-0.555*	-0.548*
	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.124)
ρ					-0.036
					0.066
Log Likelihood	-7128	-7116	-7102	-7098	-13690
No. of obs.	4,074	4,074	4,074	4,074	3,721

** and * for sigificantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 % probability level.

Appendix Table 2. The Voting Equation. Tobit Model

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Quality	1.724**	1.725**	1.710**	1.713**	1.668**
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.274)
Lagged vote	0.051*	0.045	0.024	0.025	0.023
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Order of pref.	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Host country	0.197	0.222	0.162	0.190	0.078
	(0.407)	(0.405)	(0.404)	(0.403)	(0.540)
Sung in English	0.272	0.359	0.211	0.262	0.033
	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.258)	(0.259)	(0.445)
Sung in French	0.485	0.486	0.443	0.451	0.246
	(0.326)	(0.325)	(0.331)	(0.331)	(0.446)
Male singer	0.194	0.218	0.202	0.220	0.179
	(0.260)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.253)
Duet	0.752*	0.617	0.739*	0.683	0.606
	(0.356)	(0.356)	(0.356)	(0.356)	(0.353)
Group	0.247	0.212	0.205	0.191	0.090
	(0.266)	(0.265)	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.254)
Language		-1.746**		-0.974*	-0.867*
		(0.370)		(0.401)	(0.385)
Power			-0.022*	-0.019*	-0.013
			(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Individualism			-0.006	-0.003	-0.002
			(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Masculinity			-0.009	-0.010*	-0.009
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Uncertainty Avoidance			-0.021**	-0.018**	-0.018**
			(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Intercept	-4.955**	-3.943**	-3.300**	-2.933**	-2.734**
	(0.317)	(0.376)	(0.410)	(0.435)	(0.779)
Log. Likelihood	-7580	-7569	-7555	-7552	12678
No. of obs.	4074	4074	4074	4074	3721

** and * for sigificantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 % probability level.